Whatever happened to cycling? Powerbrokers play politics as the sport suffers

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Française Des Jeux(Image credit: Bettini Photo)

News feature: March 8, 2007

Bored with cycling politics? Don't be. It's serious. If cycling's doping scandals were not enough, the UCI vs. Grand Tour organisers spat has the potential to do irreparable damage. While some fans may turn away because of doping, to think of major events like Paris-Nice and even le Tour itself without the best riders in the world seems unimaginable. But it nearly happened this month. Although the UCI backed down and there is now a 'cease-fire', the war is far from over. So how did it get this bad? Cyclingnews' staffers Laura Weislo, Hedwig Kröner and Shane Stokes find out that it's all about the Benjamins.

Recently, you will have read - or maybe skipped over - all this reporting on Unibet and the Grand Tours and obscure European legislation about advertising gambling. It may seem irrelevant, but it's not really, because it reveals serious management issues in the sport that will affect the fans' enjoyment, and the riders' career prospects. So, who is to blame? Review the following issues and decide for yourself, but the last time we looked, media companies tended to guard their revenue streams like the crown jewels.

With an estimated €500 million in European bets taking place over the internet in 2006, the Internet gaming industry is huge, and stands to grow even larger. Industry experts estimate that in the next five years, this figure could be ten times that amount. That's why Unibet.com, an online gambling website that allows any Internet user across Europe to place bets on sports, casino games and other types of gambling, is throwing its weight behind a cycling team.

In France, betting and gambling is illegal except for the national lottery (managed by the semi-public company La Française des Jeux), horse races managed by PMU and casinos. With €9.5 billion in sales in 2006 by La Française Des Jeux alone, these industries do not welcome the competition from Unibet and other online gambling institutions, and the issue has recently swung toward the side of the Internet gaming industry.

None of this would matter to the world of cycling, except that Unibet.com decided to throw large amounts of money into sponsoring a team, and fought tooth and nail to become a ProTour squad. They committed millions in sponsorship of cycling despite the fact that in September of 2006 the company was already facing legal action from La Française Des Jeux, with the Belgian national Lottery, Lotto, also threatening to follow - which it now has.

Yet, the UCI granted a license to Unibet knowing that online gambling, and the advertising of online gambling companies, is considered illegal on French soil. ASO president Patrice Clerc told Cyclingnews in January that: "Unibet was completely informed about our position and our options from the beginning of the month of December." Even though Spain and Italy don't have the same restrictions as France, all three Grand Tour organisers - previously fierce competitors - stood united in refusing to invite Unibet.com as a wildcard to any of their events as early as last year: a foreshadowing of what would happen once Unibet.com's team was granted a ProTour license.

The Unibet.com has repeatedly offered a concession to the French promoters - GM Koen Terryn promised that the team will to continue to wear the kits without the Unibet name for all French races as they did earlier this year in the GP Marseillaise and Etoile de Bessèges. But precedents in football have shown that this isn't an acceptable solution. Bwin's German football club Werder Bremen, put "we win" on their jerseys after a similar dispute, but that too was soon prohibited as the connection was still clear.

The magic number agreed upon by the Grand Tour organisers, 18, was the maximum number that they agreed would allow them to invite three or four of the smaller teams from their own country as wildcards. Wildcards do give much needed publicity and therefore sponsorship support to those teams, allowing that country's development of professional cyclists. But some critics refer to the wildcards as 'cash cards' - insinuating that the teams are buying their way in to the tours. If that is the case, fewer wildcards could mean significantly less money for the organisers.

For the first two years, the ProTour was run with 20 teams, inciting a lengthy sparring match between the two sides in the press. However, in 2006, the ProTour vs. Grand Tour morass appeared to dry out, and the UCI agreed to a compromise to reduce the number of teams from 20 to 18 by 2009. The time frame would have allowed several four year licenses to lapse, providing a convenient chance to reduce the number.

Just three days before Unibet's license was officially announced, the Grand Tour organisers got together and agreed that they would only automatically invite the 18 teams that held ProTour licenses at the beginning of December, thus omitting Unibet and Astana, whose licenses were pending. Still, the UCI went ahead and sold Unibet a license, even though it was aware of the problems the team would face getting invited to the so-called ProTour races.

At the time, UCI president Pat McQuaid claimed he wasn't interested in the hundreds of millions of euros that were at stake. "The point is that we don't have a commercial interest in earning money out of these events or earning money out of television rights, as has been claimed by Patrice Clerc. That is one of the Grand Tour organisers' big objections, they think that in future we are going to start looking for a proportion of their television rights. But this is completely untrue."

Yet, when the ProTour council (CUPT) met in Salzburg during the World Championships, they responded to another threat by the ASO, RCS Sport and Unipublic to run their races on a separate calendar from the ProTour, releasing a statement that read: "The most recent attacks from ASO against the UCI ProTour appear to be, as those of the last few years, totally unfounded, and clearly demonstrate that ASO has only one goal: protect its position of superiority in the distribution of the marketing and TV incomes from organisers (around 70%)."

When the ProTour vs. Grand Tour fight reached a critical point over Paris-Nice invitations, the resulting cease-fire agreement hammered out in Monday's eight hour meeting saw the UCI backpedalling on the issue, stating, "For the remainder of the present convention, ASO, RCS [Sport -sic] and Unipublic are not obliged - in any manner - to be bound by the concept of the ProTour and its branding, except for the acceptance of the wearing of the jersey corresponding to the leader of the classification."

By grudgingly agreeing to the Grand Tour's loophole on invitations, the UCI has seemingly brought the conflict back around full circle to January 13, when the ASO first announced they would not invite the team to Paris-Nice. And as the Grand Tours begin another cycle of reiterating their years-old stance, all that remains for cycling fans is to wonder - has the situation turned full circle? Or has it entered a death spiral?